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Abstract 
This paper analyzes effects of population aging on the labor market and determines their broad 
implications for public policy. It takes Germany as an example, but it equally applies to the other large 
economies in Continental Europe. The paper argues that, alongside the amply discussed, 
demographically-determined increase in the contribution and tax burden which is responsible for the 
ever widening gap between gross and disposable earnings, two other important areas of policy deserve 
greater attention. First, it is unlikely that the decline in the relative size of the economically active 
population will be offset by higher capital intensity. Labor productivity will need to increase over and 
above this mechanism in order to compensate for the impact of population aging on domestic 
production. Hence, we will need more education and training to speed up human capital formation. 
Second, the shift in the age structure will also change the structure of demand for goods. This, in turn, 
will have large effects on the pattern of employment across different sectors of the economy and will 
require a substantial increase in labor mobility in order to accommodate these structural changes. 
 ADDRESS: 
 Axel Börsch-Supan 
 MEA, University of Mannheim 
 D-68131 Mannheim, Germany 
 Fax: +49-621-181-1861 
 Email: Axel@Boersch-Supan.de 
 
 
I would like to thank Anette Reil-Held and Joachim Winter for their helpful comments, Alexander Ludwig, 
Konrad Menzel and Michael Peters for their research assistance, David Allison for translating this paper from the 
German original, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the VW-Stiftung, the Gesamtverband der 
Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft and the Land Baden Württemberg for their financial support. 
 1
Labor market effects of population aging 
Axel Börsch-Supan 
 
 
Introduction 
The accelerating pace of demographic change will prove to be one of the key factors shaping 
the development of society in the coming decades. And yet, although this is by no means a 
new insight, to date public debate and academic research on aging has for the most part 
focused on the impact of demographic trends on social policy, and in particular on the 
problem of financing public retirement income provision. However, demographic change will 
also induce profound macroeconomic structural changes which will exercise an influence on 
all the key markets – the labor market, the markets for goods and services, and capital 
markets. We take Germany as an example, but the paper equally applies to the other large 
economies in Continental Europe. 
♦ Demographic change will have a massive impact on production if, in Germany in the year 
2035, an approximately 15% smaller labor force is to sustain today’s levels of 
consumption. This can only be achieved by strong productivity growth which in turn is 
dependent on increased physical capital intensity and strengthened human capital. Wages 
will rise, while limited international diversification will reduce the return on capital. 
While the qualitative nature of these tendencies is undisputed, the quantitative extent of 
these changes is as yet uncertain. 
♦ Demographic change will have a huge impact on the structure of consumption: demand 
will shift towards more services and products for older members of the community. Shifts 
in demand of this nature imply structural change in production with the concomitant 
frictions, e.g. short-term unemployment, particularly if current levels of sector mobility 
remain low. The quantitative effects are also unclear. On the one hand, some observers 
appear to hope that demographic change will, as it were, solve the problem of 
unemployment automatically. On the other hand, high levels of frictional unemployment 
may widen the qualification gap producing a situation in which the highly qualified are in 
short supply and the poorly qualified out of work – exacerbating a phenomenon which is 
already a cause of concern today. 
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♦ Demographic change will also alter international economic relations. Capital will flow 
from countries with a relatively old population to those with a relatively young population 
where the rates of return will be higher. Even if the population of the world as a whole 
were to grow older, the relative differences in age structure would be sufficient to trigger 
major movements of capital. This insight is especially important for Germany which 
already has one of the highest proportions of senior citizens of any country in the world. 
These capital flows will need to be financed via the balance of payments, however. As a 
result, Germany is likely to be transformed from one of the world’s leading export nations 
into a net importer. Increased imports go hand in hand with shortages of labor. The 
quantitative magnitude is once again unclear. 
It is important that these developments are anticipated, not least in order to cushion or avert 
altogether the potentially harsh repercussions and transition problems. While the problems 
themselves are beginning to show up on the radar screens of governments and international 
organizations, neither the data nor the models needed to arrive at a quantitative assessment of 
these developments are as yet available. 
This paper focuses primarily on the impact of population aging on the labor market and asks 
to what extent fiscal and social policy may be able to mitigate potential problems. The paper 
does not deal in any narrow sense with the central issue of reforming the pension, health and 
long-term care insurance systems – these issues and others are reviewed by Börsch-Supan 
(2000c). The present paper aims rather to shed light on the structural changes occurring on the 
labor market - the age structure of workers, their labor productivity and wage structure. A 
complementary paper (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2001) examines the implications 
of population aging on capital markets. This paper may be regarded as dealing with human 
capital, while the complementary paper deals with real capital. 
The paper is divided into two parts. The first part describes the impact of population aging on 
the labor market and initially outlines the various forecast scenarios of labor supply 
development. We then draw on a series of models to estimate the changes in the most 
important structural features of the labor market. The first part lays the groundwork for the 
second, significantly shorter part which examines the impact and potential proactive scope of 
fiscal and social policy. As this is an immensely wide-ranging subject, we have restricted 
ourselves in this paper to drawing conclusions about one or two key issues: where can the 
state act to mitigate the effects of population aging on the labor market? 
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Part I: The impact of population aging on the labor market 
This part presents the relevant forecasts. How will the size of the labor force develop? What 
will be the age structure of the active working population? How will the shift in the age 
structure effect labor productivity? What will happen to wage levels? What feedback effects 
might potential changes in capital intensity have? How will structural changes on product 
markets influence labor mobility? 
All forecasts are based on a common population projection. We will regard these projections 
as given and will merely explore some parametric scenarios. These population projections  
will then be used to determine the size of the working population. In this context 
consideration will be given to the feedback effects which may arise from population aging 
and potential fiscal and social policy reforms undertaken in response to demographic change. 
As we know very little about the elasticity of labor supply and demand, we again will 
examine these feedback effects in different scenario settings. We then go a step further with 
variables such as capital intensity and wage levels: these are the results of equilibrium 
mechanisms and therefore require explicit modeling. 
In the following we initially describe our population projection, present various forecasts of 
the development of the working population, and finally draw on a series of models ranging 
from simple “shift share” approaches to a general equilibrium model of overlapping 
generations. 
1.  Forecast demographic trends 
Demographic projections are based on the medium variant of the Birg and Börsch-Supan 
(1999) population forecast. The basic assumptions of this projection broadly conform with 
those of the “Variant 2a” of the “Ninth Coordinated Population Forecast” carried out by the 
Federal Statistical Office (2000). This study assumes a stagnating birth rate (a fertility rate of 
1.35 births per woman), a continuing increase in life expectancy (up to 80.1 and 86.4 years for 
men and women respectively in the year 2050), and long-term positive net immigration (on 
average around 120,000 arrivals a year). 
We also vary these assumptions in order to scrutinize their influence and adopt, for example, 
the alternative assumption of a gradual increase in the birth rate to the levels projected by the 
UN (1.64 births per woman), a 1.5-year higher and lower increase in life expectancy in the 
year 2050, and net immigration of plus/minus 100,000 persons. Overall we consider four 
population projections representing the outer bounds of potential demographic development: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                
Population projection B1: strong aging, constant fertility 
Population projection B2: modest aging, constant fertility 
Population projection B3: modest aging, increasing fertility 
Population projection B4: weak aging, increasing fertility 
Based on a population of 82.1 million in 1998, all four variants predict a slight decline in 
population to between 74.7 million (variant B1) and 81.6 million (variant B4) in the year 
2030. In our view, scenario B2 probably reflects most accurately population trends showing a 
decline of 6.6% to 77.0 million in the year 2030. 
The author of this paper is not unduly concerned about this decline in population. On the 
other hand, the old-age dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of the number of people aged over 60 
to the number of 20 to 59-year-olds) increases dramatically from 38.6% in 1998 to between 
76.7% (variant B4) and 88.4% (variant B1) in the year 2030 and will, in the most 
advantageous scenario, almost double. In the most probable variant, B2, the old age 
dependency ratio increases by a factor of2.13 to 82.3%. This represents the core of the “aging 
problem” and relates to the structure, not the absolute size, of the German population.1
2.  Forecast labor supply 
While the variant population projections only begin to diverge significantly after the year 
2040, assumptions regarding labor force participation are critical to forecast labor supply 
already in the coming decade. We initially adopt a mechanistic approach in which age, gender 
and immigrant-related labor force participation rates, predetermined as specific scenarios 
across the chronological axis, are multiplied with projected population figures. The number of 
primary pensioners (i.e. persons with claims substantiated on the basis of their own gainful 
employment) is equal to the number of working people leaving the labor force. Later in this 
paper we discuss the endogenous nature of wages (section 5) and labor supply in relation to 
fiscal and social policy (sections 9 and 10). 
These feedback effects are taken into account implicitly however in the form of scenarios 
defined on the basis of assumptions regarding 
Converging male and female labor force participation 
 
1 Population aging and population decline are related phenomena in Germany. This need not necessarily be the 
case, however, as the example of the USA shows. The birth rate in the USA has not declined as dramatically, 
while life expectancy has increased by at least as much as it has in Germany. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Converging labor force participation rates in eastern and western Germany 
Converging immigrant and indigenous labor force participation rates  
Increase in retirement age 
Decline of the unemployment rate 
We summarize these assumptions in three labor force scenarios: 
Labor force scenario E1: weak increase in labor force participation 
Labor force scenario E2: modest increase in labor force participation 
Labor force scenario E3: substantial increase in labor force participation 
Table 1 shows the concrete assumptions for these three labor force scenarios. In scenario E1 
we assume that current labor force participation rates will continue to remain fundamentally 
unchanged in the future. The labor market will only be relieved to the extent that demographic 
changes will decrease the pressure of unemployment to some extent leveling the long-term 
unemployment rate out at around 7%. This scenario assumes in particular that reforms 
initiated so far will not result in an increase in the retirement age, that female labor force 
participation rates do not increase to match male participation rates and that those of the 
eastern states do not converge with those in the West. Finally, the differentials in the labor 
force participation rates of immigrant and the indigenous population are projected into the 
future at constant rates. We do not believe that this scenario E1 would be a likely 
development. The assumption is excessively pessimistic and merely serves to illustrate how 
great the pressure on fiscal and social policy could become. 
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Table 1: Labor force scenarios 
 
Convergence of labor force participation rates 
 
 
Between 
women and 
men [%] 
Between East 
and West [%]
Between 
immigrants and 
Germans [%] 
Increase in 
retirement age 
[years] 
Unemployment 
rate 
[%] 
 E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 
2010 0 20 30 0 20 30 0 5 5 0 1 1 9 9 9 
2030 0 40 70 0 85 100 0 10 15 0 2 3 7 7 7 
2050 0 60 90 0 100 100 0 15 25 0 3 5 7 5 4 
 
 
In our view, scenario E2 portrays the most likely development of patterns of gainful 
employment. In this scenario, the gap is gradually narrowed between the male and female 
labor force participation rates such that the difference between the two rates will be halved by 
the year 2040 and should stabilize at around 40% of the current rate difference in the long 
term. East German labor force participation rates will have converged with West German 
rates by the year 2050. The labor force participation rate of the immigrants will also develop 
positively although it will only converge to a limited extent with the participation rate of the 
native German working population. The increase in the retirement age shown in this scenario 
conforms with the results of econometric studies performed by Börsch-Supan (2000b), 
Siddiqui (1997) and Schmidt (1995) on the consequences of statutory changes to state pension 
schemes since 1990. These studies foresee an increase in the effective retirement age of 2 
years by the year 2030 and of 3 years in the long term. Finally, unemployment will fall 
sharply by 2030 stabilizing at 5%. 
As stressed above, a more elegant approach would, for example, be to draw on a model of the 
labor market to demonstrate explicitly how patterns of gainful employment might respond to 
instituted and future pension reform plans. However, in order to do this we would need 
reliable estimates of labor supply elasticity in relation to net earnings (after deducting social 
security contributions). No such estimates are available and we shall, for the time being, have 
to make do with a presentation of different scenarios. 
Scenario E3 presents a highly optimistic estimate of developing patterns of gainful 
employment. In this scenario, the female participation rate will converge almost entirely with 
that of men in the decades ahead. The participation rate for women will be 70% of the male 
rate in the year 2030 rising to 90% in 2050. The labor force participation rate in the new states 
in eastern Germany will also converge relatively quickly with the rate in the former West 
German states and by the year 2030 there should be no difference in patterns of gainful 
employment between both parts of Germany. The participation rate of immigrants will slowly 
converge with that of the Germans although we also assume below-average levels of activity 
for this group in the long term. The retirement age rises significantly by 3 years up to the year 
2030 and by up to 5 years by 2050. This means that the effective average retirement age will 
rise from just under 60 at present to almost 65 years. Finally, we assume in this scenario that 
the shift in the age structure will take considerable pressure off the labor market and will lead 
to a drop in currently very high rates of unemployment to the long-term natural rate of 
unemployment which we assume to be 4%. Like the other extreme (scenario E1) also this 
scenario E3 does not reflect our estimate of the probable development of the labor market. We 
consider the employment levels predicted by this scenario – a combination of all the most 
positive circumstances - to be too optimistic. 
What follows from these assumptions? The size of the labor force declines dramatically in all 
three scenarios. This also applies to the very optimistic scenario E3, as shown in figure 1: 
Figure 1: Labor force in Germany, 2000-2050 [in millions] 
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Source: Own calculations based on population projection B2 
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Despite the increase in participation rates predicted by the most probable scenario E2, the size 
of the labor force as measured in the year 2000 is nonetheless set to fall by around 8 million 
in the long term. In other words the labor market will contract – in absolute terms by more 
than twice the current number of unemployed. 
As the population will also decline, the relative fall in unemployment will not be quite so 
great however. This is revealed by figure 2 which shows the size of the labor force as a share 
of the adult population - the so called support ratio. In the average scenario E2, the support 
ratio drops from 56% in the year 2000 to 49% in the year 2035. 
Figure 2: Support ratio (labor force as share of total adult population), 2000-2050 [in %] 
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Source: Own calculations based on population projection B2 
 
The support ratio will fall fastest in the 25 year period between 2010 and 2035. This means 
that in the year 2035 the working population will need to be almost 15% more productive than 
in the year 2010 if it is to produce the same per capita quantity of consumer and capital goods. 
This would require an annual productivity growth rate of around 0.45 percentage points from 
2010 to 2035. In other words, around a third of average, long-term real productivity growth of 
approximately 1.4% (Buchheim 1998) will be “eaten up” by the relative decrease in the size 
of the labor force. 
This is true of the most probable scenario E2. Figure 2 shows the variability range for this 
forecast. In the most pessimistic scenario E3, almost half of the long-term improvement in 
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productivity is required over a period of 50 years in order to compensate for the drop in the 
support ratio. On the other hand, in the optimistic scenario E1 the shift in the age structure is 
compensated for almost entirely by the increase in participation rates. 
The first conclusion we can draw from these projections is that we will almost certainly 
require very strong productivity growth if we are to sustain the rates of growth to which we 
are accustomed. We shall therefore address the issue of productivity in greater detail in 
sections 3, 4 and 5. 
However, the contraction in the size of the labor market will be nothing like as dramatic in its 
effects as the burden of financing pensions which will weigh on the labor force expressed by 
the so-called old-age dependency ratio (number of pensioners divided by the number of 
people in gainful employment). This ratio is shown in figures 3 and 4 respectively for each 
population and work scenario forecast. 
Figure 3: Old-age dependency ratio associated with various population forecasts 
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Source: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) 
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All the forecast variants predict a sharp rise in the old-age dependency ratio. Figure 3 also 
demonstrates that the aging problem will persist even given a positive turnaround in the birth 
rate. Differing fertility assumptions only impact after 2035. In the most likely case, the old-
age dependency ratio will rise from a figure today of around 55% to just under 90% in the 
year 2035. Depending on the population projection used, the ratio ranges between 83% and 
95%. “Sidestepping” the aging problem is not therefore an option; the most we can do is to 
slow the pace of the increase during the “twenties” of the 21st century. In none of the 
scenarios are the “low” (although in international terms, nonetheless high) old-age 
dependency ratios of recent decades likely to be re-established in the decades ahead. 
This assessment would only be slightly modified by even radical changes in future 
participation rates as figure 4 reveals. Comparing this with figure 3, it is apparent that 
between the two extreme work scenarios there is a far broader range of old-age dependency 
ratios than there is between the extreme population projections. 
Figure 4: Old-age dependency ratio associated with various work scenarios 
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In the (unlikely) case of a positive development in gainful employment (E3), the old-age 
dependency ratio will rise to and remain more or less constant at around 77%. This scenario 
hinges on the retirement age being raised by five years, the almost total convergence of the 
female participation rate and a reduction in the unemployment rate to 4%. It is important to 
note that the alternative, extremely negative (and equally unlikely) work scenario (E1) does 
not result in a symmetrically opposite outcome to the positive extreme E3. The old-age 
dependency ratio deviates by almost twice as much upwards from the reference case showing 
the most probable work scenario than it does downwards. This means that if the pattern of 
gainful employment should change negatively, the old-age dependency ratio will reach an 
extremely high level in the year 2050. If this development takes place (no change in the 
retirement age, constant level of female work activity, slight reduction in the unemployment 
rate to 7%) the old-age dependency ratio will rise to over 110% in the year 2030 and will 
continue to increase in the ensuing period. 
In summary: the decline in the working population as a share of the (consuming and 
investing) population as a whole will “eat up” around one third of long-term productivity 
growth. In other words: annual productivity gains need to increase by a third if we are to 
experience the sustained levels of growth to which we are accustomed. More dramatic, 
however, is the rise in the old-age dependency ratio which, in the most likely scenario, is set 
to double. 
3.  Age structure of the working population 
Not only the size but also the age structure of the working population will change radically in 
the coming decades. Figure 5 shows the age composition of the labor force between the years 
2000 and 2050. The distribution peak very clearly moves from left to right. The modal age 
today (2000) is 36 years of age; 10 years later this increases to 46 years, and a further 10 years 
on it has risen to 54 years. The baby boomers then retire – the age distribution curve flattens 
out and changes very little in the following years. 
 
Figure 5a: Age structure of the working population, 2000-2050 
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Figure 5b: Age structure of the working population, 2000-2050 
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accounted for by workers aged 55 years or older (figure 6b). This clearly demonstrates the 
temporary “rejuvenation” of the labor force when the baby boom generation retires. The data 
also reveals - and this is an important message - that the shift in the age structure is not a 
transitory phenomenon but represents a permanent change. 
 
Figure 6a:  
Average age of the labor force 
Figure 6b:  
Share of the labor force over 55 years 
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4. Age structure and labor productivity 
What effects will this fundamental change in the age structure of the working population 
have? The most important – and most controversial – aspect is the potential effect on labor 
productivity. If labor productivity is age dependent, a shift in the age structure will also bring 
about a change in aggregate productivity, even if age-specific productivity were to remain 
constant. This section provides a gross estimate of the approximate magnitude of this effect . 
This is not a simple task, however, as there is no reliable data available on age-specific labor 
productivity. Barth et al. (1993) conclude from a survey of human resource executives in 406 
organizations that “Older workers were consistently rated as having more positive attitudes 
being more reliable and possessing better skills than the average worker; they were rated 
worse than the average worker when it comes to health care costs, flexibility in accepting new 
assignments, and suitability for training.” Moreover, productivity tends to be a highly 
individual and sector-specific factor. Labor productivity cannot be “worked out” by means of 
simple stratification and averaging as workers select themselves in sectors and professions 
according to their own productivity and this self-selection changes with age – and 
consequently with the shift in the age structure. Age-specific labor productivity must  
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therefore be identified from panel data on individual work input and individually attributable 
output. Studies based on cross-sectional data confound age, cohort and selection effects. 
Modeling these effects would exceed the scope of this paper and, given the scantiness of the 
available data, would hardly be feasible. See Hutchins (2001) for a discussion of the 
usefulness of employer survey to address these issues. We therefore take a much cruder 
approach and simply apply two extreme estimates of age-specific productivity derived from  
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) to the German data which should, roughly at least, capture the 
range of possible effects. The function of these estimates as “strawmen” should become 
apparent at the end of this section. For this reason, the reader may wish to suspend any 
detailed criticism of the estimates for the time being. 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) evaluate confidential data originating from a major US American 
service enterprise. They provide two estimates. On the one hand, we interpret the age and 
seniority-specific earnings of sales staff, which are proportionally linked to the value of the 
sales contracts clinched by such staff, as age and seniority-specific productivity. Figure 7 
shows these earnings as a function of age (abscissa) and age on joining the firm (set of curves 
parameter). 
 
Figure 7: Age and seniority-specific earnings of salesmen 
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Source: Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) 
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As the curves are basically congruent, we draw on the profile of sales employees recruited at 
the age of 20 for the first estimate of age-specific labor productivity. This curve is relatively 
flat. The employee’s piece rate remuneration more than doubles during the first junior 
employment period of around 15 years. Piece-rate remuneration – our initial measure of 
productivity – only begins to fall again between the ages of 55 and 60 years. 
Salesmen whose pay is wholly performance related are by no means representative of a 
modern service economy. We therefore turn to salaried office workers for our second estimate 
of age-specific labor productivity. The difficulty here, however, is that salaried workers pay 
generally encompasses a major seniority element which severs the tie between pay and 
productivity across the life cycle. Figure 8 shows this phenomenon quite clearly: the pay of 
“novices” is significantly lower than that of the “old hands”. The sharp fall which takes place 
once the age of 60 has been reached is almost certainly a statistical artifact, however, as most 
of the salaried workers employed by this company take early retirement. The earnings of 
novices however once again reveal a strong age link. We draw on this age – salary pattern of 
newly recruited staff as our second estimate for the age-specific labor productivity of salaried 
workers. This turns out to be considerably “curvier” than the profile shown in figure 7. 
 
Figure 8: Age and seniority-specific earnings of salarymen 
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Source: Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) 
 
Table 9 shows the normalized age-productivity estimates. They feature a distinct bell-shaped 
curve which peaks for salaried workers at the age of 44 years and subsequently falls rapidly 
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while sales employees’ productivity maximum is reached 4 years later and is much less 
pronounced. In both cases, our strawman labor productivity is about 20% of its lifecycle 
maximum at around 16 years and sinks back down to this level again at 75 years. 
 
Figure 9: Relative labor productivity of salesmen and salarymen 
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Source: Derived from Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) 
 
The point of this exercise becomes clear in figure 10. We now multiply age-dependent 
productivity (figure 9) with the gradually changing distribution of the age structure of the 
working population (figure 5) in order to calculate the time path of the aggregated 
productivity of the labor force. The results are shown in figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Relative labor productivity of salesmen and salarymen 
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Despite the marked (and for the reader possibly alarming) age dependency of the labor 
productivity estimates in figure 9, there is only a minor drop in aggregate labor productivity. 
If the estimate is based on the productivity of sales staff, the drop is negligible. In the extreme 
case, in which the estimate is based on recruited salaried workers, the drop amounts to around 
3% in 20 years. This is equal to a reduction in productivity of around 0.15% per annum. The 
scale of this change is therefore considerably smaller than the effect of the falling support 
ratio which we considered in section 2, figure 2. In other words, the potential productivity 
effects induced by the age structure of the working population are much smaller than the loss 
of production arising as a result of the fall in the relative size of the economically active 
population 
While more research is certainly needed to measure the relation between age and productivity 
in all its complex dimensions pointed out by Barth et al. (1993), the main message of this 
section is therefore that Germany will face are likely severe problems elsewhere, and not 
through an unproductive old labor force. 
5.  Population aging and wage levels 
The mechanistic “shift share” method used in the previous sections ignores any economic 
equilibrium analysis. The method is used to isolate partial effects and to draw attention to 
their potential magnitude. This is particularly the case for the results in section 4: Age 
structure related productivity effects are also likely to be small when regarded in an 
equilibrium framework. 
We go a step further in this and the following section and analyze the equilibrium effects of 
population aging on the labor market. Section 2 demonstrated clearly that population 
development in the decades ahead implies that labor will become a relatively scarce resource. 
Wages will therefore rise and capital will increasingly substitute for labor, i.e. capital intensity 
will rise and with it labor productivity. This section considers wage levels, Section 6 looks at 
the development of capital intensity and the productivity effect which these induce. 
For the purposes of this analysis we draw on a model of overlapping generations (OLG) 
developed by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001) based on the tradition of models 
established by Diamond (1965) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The model used here 
adds an international dimension and capital mobility. As will become clear, this is an 
important addition for Germany in particular. We apply the model to two scenarios of capital 
mobility: firstly to Germany as a closed economy, and secondly to Germany as an open 
economy with perfect capital mobility between it and the other OECD countries. We also 
vary a political parameter which is important for the formation of wages and capital – the mix 
of the pension system in terms of pay-as-you-go versus funded. 
In the following we sketch out the model’s basic equations. For the sake of clarity, the 
country index has been omitted for the time being. For a more detailed description and 
critique of the model, refer to Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). 
Our model covers 75 living cohorts; each model period corresponds to a period of one year. 
Each new generation is already 20 years old when it enters the model and immediately enters 
gainful employment. Each generation then continues working up to the retirement age of R 
and remains in retirement until the oldest modeled age of 94 years or up to period 75. As we 
are able to vary the size of economically-active or retired generations according to our 
population scenarios, our stylized model is capable of incorporating demographic 
developments (such as greater life expectancy) in detail. 
We “feed” the German part of the OLG model with the results of the population and labor 
force forecasts in sections 1 and 2. We use the latest UN projections for the remaining OECD 
countries (United Nations Population Division, 2000). At each point in time t, a number of 
exogenous variables are thus given: the size of each of the 75 living cohorts, , whereby 
assuming a fixed retirement age of 60, this corresponds for a = 1, ..., 39 to the size of the labor 
force  aged a and for a = 40, ..., 75 the number of pensioners  aged a. We vary the 
pensionable age on the basis of (exogenous) forecast changes in the labor force. The labor 
supply remains inelastic in all other respects (i.e. it does not react to endogenous wage and 
non-wage labor costs). The latter is a fallacious assumption as we shall discuss in sections 9 
and 10; however, as stressed a number of times already, modeling social insurance incentive 
effects would exceed the scope of this OLG model by far. 
N t
a
a
tL
a
tZ
The core of the model is production technology characterized by a CED production function 
(1) ( ) βββ αα /11 1/11/11 )1( −−− −+= tttt LKAY . 
At represents (exogenously given) total factor productivity; all other symbols assume their 
standard meaning. The parameters are shown in Table 2. 
On the basis of the constant profit maximization of a representative firm producing on the 
domestic market we obtain the wage rate (gross earnings) 
(2) . ( ) ( ) ββββ ααα /1)1/(1/11/11 )1(1 −−−− −+−= ttttt LLKAw
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The total capital stock in the economy of each country develops according to the recursion 
(3) ( ) ttt KIK δ−+=+ 11  
and defines the capital intensity Kt/Lt. 
In the household sector, each generation aged a maximizes, at any point in time t, the sum of 
discounted future utility. We use a within-period utility function with constant relative risk 
aversion 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )∑= −−+−+−=
75 1
1
1
1
1
aj
j
ajtaj
a
t CUE
σ
ρσ  
to obtain the consumption  and wealth  of generation a at the point in time t. This 
wealth consists of the shares of domestic and foreign capital stock in the hands of households. 
a
tC
a
tW
The OLG model is augmented by the pay-as-you-go pension system the determining variables 
of which are the contribution rate τt and the replacement rate Rt. These parameters are linked 
with each other by the pension system’s budget equation: 
(5) . ttttttt ZwRLw )1( ττ −=
In effect this constitutes a multi-pillar pension system. The second/third pillars are implicitly 
formed by household savings generated by the maximization of life-time utility (4). For τt = 0, 
total retirement income comes from private savings. On the other hand, there is a τmax for 
which the pay-as-you-go system totally crowds out household savings. We use two scenarios. 
In the first scenario, the replacement rate Rt is fixed and the contribution rate τt is adjusted to 
the change in the age structure (“perpetuation of the old pay-as-you-go system”). In the 
second scenario, the replacement rate Rt is reduced as the population grows older such that the 
contribution rate τt remains constant (“freezing model”). As this results in increased savings, 
this scenario models a gradual transition to a pension system based on a substantially higher 
pre-funded component. 
Four aggregation conditions close the model and ensure market clearing and general 
equilibrium at all times. Initially, the following applies in all countries: 
(6) ,         and    . ∑
=
⋅=
75
1a
a
t
a
tt NWW ∑
=
⋅=
75
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a
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=
=
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Finally, the perfect capital mobility produced by a uniform world interest rate rt, guarantees 
that the world capital market will be cleared, i.e. that global wealth equals global capital 
stock: 
(7) . ∑
=
L
i
itW
1
, ∑
=
=
L
i
itK
1
,
The capital account mirrors capital flows and as all goods are tradable, we may disregard real 
exchange rate effects. 
The model’s equilibrium paths are determined numerically using a recursive computation. 
The values used in the calibration of our model are standard in the literature on OLG models 
(Miles, 1999; Fehr, 1999), refer to Table 2: 
Table 2: OLG model parameters 
α: Factor capital as share of gross national product  0.4 
β: Elasticity of production substitution  0.999 
δ: Depreciation rate  0.05 
dAt/dt: Exogenous rate of technical progress  0.0139 
ρ: Rate of time preference  0.08 
σ: Elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption  3.0 
 
We first apply the model to the development of wages. Figure 11 shows the increase in gross 
earnings in relation to the increase which would have occurred if the population had remained 
constant. This is positive up to the year 2030, but very minor in both scenarios. It is useful to 
compare this increase in gross earnings with the rise in disposable earnings if we assume that 
age-specific public spending values for 1997 are retained and are financed by a corresponding 
increase in contributions and taxes (perpetuation of the old pay-as-you-go system at 1997 
pension levels; similarly, age-specific expenditure by the statutory health insurance and long-
term care schemes including all central government financial support). Figure 12 shows that 
the increase in gross earnings resulting from labor shortages is dominated entirely by the age-
related increase in contributions and taxes. 
The main message of this section is therefore that the shift in the age structure will not bring 
about a secular increase in earnings of a significant magnitude. It is also apparent that the 
increase in social security contributions will be the central factor generating future price 
changes in the labor market. 
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Figure 11: Index of Gross Wages (2000=100). 
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Source: Own calculations, based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). The triangles show the values 
for a closed aging economy, the squares show those for an open aging economy. As a comparison, the solid 
line depicts the case of a closed economy with a stationary population. All simulations assume the 
perpetuation of the present pension system. All figures in real terms and indexed to year 2000=100. 
 
 
Figure 12: Index of Net Wages (2000=100). 
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Source: Own calculations, based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). The triangles show the values 
for a closed aging economy, the squares show those for an open aging economy. As a comparison, the solid 
line depicts the case of a closed economy with a stationary population. All simulations assume the 
perpetuation of the present pension system. All figures in real terms and indexed to year 2000=100. 
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6.   Feedback effects of capital intensity 
The shortage of labor accompanying the aging of the population leads to capital substitution. 
This is shown in figure 13, again drawn from our OLG model. Capital intensity per worker 
(measured in figures not in units of efficiency) would also increase if the population were to 
remain constant (or would remain constant per unit of efficiency). The increase accelerates 
however to the extent that earnings increase relative to interest as we showed in the previous 
section:2
 
Figure 13: Capital intensity 
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Source: Own calculations, based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). The squares represent the 
perpetuation of the current pension system, the triangles show the transition to a partly-funded pension system in 
line with the freezing model. For comparison purposes the case of a constant population (continuous line) is also 
shown. 
 
 
We cannot perform this calculation independently of fiscal and social policy. The gradual 
transition to a multi-pillar model, as initiated by the most recent pension reform, will shift part 
of retirement income from the pay-as-you-go to the funded system so that the capital stock – 
                                                 
2 For the development of the interest rate cf. Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). The interest rate falls 
during the course of the aging process although this can be largely compensated for by capital mobility within 
the OECD. 
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depending on the crowding out effects – continues to increase. We model this second 
feedback effect by taking the two extreme cases considered in section 5 into account in figure 
13: on the one hand, the perpetuation of the current pay-as-you-go system at current pension 
levels (and consequently with a passively rising contribution rate, cf. equation 5) and, 
secondly, the “freezing model”. In the latter case, as the level of pensions falls from cohort to 
cohort the life-cycle optimization action taken by households results in a slow increase in the 
savings ratio. The degree of substitution (i.e. the reversal of the “crowding out” effect on 
private savings exercised by the pay-as-you-go system) is generated implicitly by the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Table 2) and the other model parameters. 
Figure 13 shows that after the year 2030 the difference in pension policy will have a 
significant influence on capital intensity: while under the present pay-as-you-go system 
capital intensity will all but return to the same non-aging path after the “shock” to the system 
caused by the retirement of the baby boom generation, the crowding out effect of pension 
saving is minimal so that higher capital intensity is maintained over the longer term.3
Increasing capital intensity is also accompanied by rising average labor productivity. This is 
shown in figure 14 as an index in relation to the average labor productivity which would 
accompany a constant population. The aging-related increase in the amount of capital invested 
per worker is shown to boost labor productivity by around 6%. If, in addition, part of 
retirement income is funded, capital intensity increases even further such that labor 
productivity now rises to a level about 7% higher than the level it would have reached if the 
population had remained constant. 
 
 
3 It is important to note that there are two forms of crowding out: on the one hand, the crowding out of private 
pension savings by the pay-as-you-go system and, secondly, the crowding out of other savings by private 
retirement income. 
Figure 14: Aggregate labor productivity 
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Source: Own calculations, based on Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001). The squares represent the 
perpetuation of the current pension system, the triangles show the transition to a partly-funded pension system in 
line with the freezing model. For comparison purposes the case of a constant population (continuous line) is also 
shown. 
 
 
The overall results paint a fairly gloomy picture. In section 1 it was argued that, given the 
smaller relative size of the economically active population, we require an increase in 
productivity of around 15% compared with today if we are to be able to produce the same per 
capita quantity of goods in the year 2035 as we do today (figure 2). Our OLG model shows in 
figure 14 that at best just about half of this could be achieved by higher capital intensity. 
Moreover, any possible age-structure related reduction in aggregated labor productivity (cf. 
figure 10) would reduce the effect of higher capital intensity. 
The main message of this section is therefore that without an additional, i.e., “exogenous” 
increase in productivity of around 0.25 percentage points (from 1.39% p.a. to 1.65% p.a.) the 
per capital level of gross domestic product which would have resulted had the population not 
aged (i.e. in the case of a constant population) will be almost impossible to maintain.4
                                                 
4 It is important to note the above simulations are based on an exogenous rate of technical progress of 1.39% per 
annum which reflects the relevant rate during the calibration period 1960 to 1995. The absolute per capita level 
of gross domestic product will not therefore fall. 
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7.  Structural change and labor mobility 
We conclude our review of the impact of population aging on the labor market with a brief 
section on structural change elicited by a potential change in consumption behavior. We will 
illustrate this idea and its possible magnitude without modeling the process in detail. 
Consumption behavior changes with increasing age. Figure 15 shows the age-specific shares 
of nine broad expenditure groups specified in the 1993 income and consumption survey. It is 
noticeable that spending on goods in the group “transport and communication” falls over the 
life cycle while goods in the “health and hygiene” group, as well as costs of shelter, account 
for a growing share of older households’ budgets. 
The measurement of age-specific consumption behavior is more complicated than figure 15 
suggests, however. As these age-specific expenditure elements are calculated on the basis of 
cross-sectional data, they confound age, cohort and time effects. They can only be separated 
using panel data on the structure of spending. This data is unfortunately not available for 
Germany so that, for the time being, we must make do with the cross-sectional analysis 
presented in figure 15. Repeated cross-sections show that these age-consumption profiles did 
not change much over the recent two decades – hence, cohort effects appear to be small and 
probably do not bias figure 15 to a substantial extent. 
 
Figure 15: Age-specific distribution of consumer spending across different group of goods 
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Source: Federal Statistical Office, Survey 15, No. 5, EVS 1993. 
 
 
 
Assuming that the pattern of age-specific consumer spending shown in figure 15 remains 
much the same in the future, we are able to calculate how absolute consumer spending on the 
nine groups of goods outlined above will develop by multiplying age-specific expenditure 
with the age-group figures provided by the medium population projection B2 referred to in 
section 1. Most notably the aggregated expenditure on health calculated on this basis will 
increase with age while the corresponding spending on transport will decline. 
This will impact on employment in these sectors. Figure 16 provides a rough estimate of the 
quantitative effects. We multiply the expenditure projections with current sector-specific labor 
productivity (more precisely: with the number of workers per 1 million DM turnover as 
recorded in the German Annual Statistical Yearbook) to arrive at the time path of workers per 
sector in the course of population aging. Figure 16 shows the results compared with the year 
2000. Employment in the health sector will increase by around 7%. It will fall in the transport 
sector by around 5%. Overall, increases and decreases in employment total 18% suggesting, 
on the basis of this rough calculation, that more than a sixth of all workers will need to change 
their jobs. 
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 Figure 16: Increase/decrease in employment per goods sector 
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Source: Own calculations based on figure 15, population projection B2, and the annual abstract of statistics 
“turnover per worker” in each sector. 
 
 
 
This is only a rough calculation and merely indicates the most likely broad trend. Neither do 
the figures account for shifts within each group of goods which may also be subject to 
opposing age and cohort effects. This is particularly the case for the transport and 
communications sector, for example, where expenditure in the first subsector, “transport”, 
may in fact be expected to fall with increasing age in contrast with the subsector 
“communications” where a reduction in spending as shown in figure 15 may well be linked to 
strong cohort effects. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the broad picture presented by figure 16 tends to underestimate 
rather than overestimate the scale of these changes as shifts within each group of goods in 
turn trigger changes in employment patterns. Secular developments, such as the development 
of new products in the health sector which are likely to result in a disproportionate increase in 
the share of budgets spent on these goods, must also be taken into account. The insight at the 
core of this section, however, is that structural changes on the goods market will have a 
powerful impact on sector labor markets. 
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Part II: Conclusions for fiscal and social policy 
What are the main results of the descriptive part of this paper? And what priorities should 
fiscal and social policy consequently follow? 
In summary: 
The decline of the support ratio (the number of persons of working age relative to the 
consuming population) means that, in the year 2035, the labor force will need to be 
around 15% more productive in order to attain the level of pro capita production which 
would have arisen without the impact of aging. 
Only around half of this increase in productivity is likely to be generated “naturally” in 
the form of higher capital intensity. However, some of this increase might be lost if an 
older work force shows lower aggregated labor productivity. Hence, a large gap remains. 
An increasing number of jobs will need to be restructured owing to the age-related 
structural changes in the demand for goods. 
While gross earnings will only respond slightly to population aging, net earnings will 
drop massively if the statutory pension, health and long-term care insurance schemes 
continue to be financed largely on a pay-as-you-go basis at today's levels of service. 
This summary suggests three high-priority areas for fiscal and social policy: 
1. Reducing the contribution and tax burden by reforming social security systems 
2. Increasing labor productivity over and above that generated by higher capital intensity by 
promoting the formation of human capital 
3. Promoting, or at the very least not hindering, sectoral labor mobility 
As stressed at the beginning of this paper, we do not intend to reiterate the discussion on the 
reform of social security systems here. This is clearly a herculean task which in Germany has 
only just been initiated with the amendments currently being made as part of the so-called 
“Riester pension reform”. The literature on this subject is vast and the reader is referred to the 
relevant surveys. 
We wish to cast some light, however, on the feedback effects which played an important role 
in the discussion in Part I of this paper. The incentive effects of fiscal and social policy on 
gainful employment have been neglected in many discussions about pension reform. Section 
8 addresses the sensitivity of labor force participation of the younger generation with respect 
to increases in the contribution and tax rates. Section 9 then attempts to quantify the feedback 
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effects of pension reform on the labor force participation of the older generation. Section 10 
finishes with general policy conclusions. 
8.  Feedback effects of fiscal and social policy on the labor force 
participation of the younger generation 
In the first part of this paper we varied scenarios of gainful employment which we then 
specified as exogenously given. In section 5 we saw that the high and increasing contribution 
and tax burden represents the most significant price shock for future labor markets. This 
section draws together the scanty evidence available to estimate how great the feedback 
effects on the labor force participation of the younger generation are likely to be as a result of 
this price shock. Inverting the argument, this also provides an answer to the question as to 
how fiscal and social policy may contribute to mitigating the impact of aging on the labor 
market. 
One central issue is clearly the extent to which workers see through the “veil” of social 
security contributions to regard them as insurance premia (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 
2001). If workers were to perceive contributions as insurance premia, in other words to regard 
the social insurance system as a “fair” form of insurance, this would render the wedge 
between gross and net earnings harmless and there would be no feedback effects on labor 
supply. 
The empirical evidence is primarily based on survey results. In particular the results for 
younger workers to questions of the type “Do you expect to receive benefits corresponding in 
value to your social insurance contributions?” reveal that very few of these workers believe 
there is much equivalence between contributions and benefits and a majority perceive social 
insurance contributions as a form of tax. A summary of opinion polls of this type performed 
in Germany and other countries may be found in Börsch-Supan and Miegel (2001). A parallel 
survey in Germany, France, Italy and Spain also confirmed these results in  all four countries 
(Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001). Particularly instructive is the preference 
expressed by a majority of those surveyed in all four countries to replace 50 percent of their 
contributions to the pay-as-you-go system (which are clearly perceived as tax) by pension 
fund and/or insurance contributions of the same amount. 
Further empirical conclusions can be drawn from the actual behavior of insured workers, at 
least to the extent that they are able to “vote with their feet” and opt out of what they regard as 
an “unfair” form of insurance and to take out alternative cover. This is only possible to a very 
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limited degree in the German mandatory pension insurance system. The only way of opting 
out which is currently available is to leave dependent employment subject to compulsory 
social insurance contributions altogether. The consequent increase in self-employment and 
related forms of employment not subject to social security taxation since the mid-eighties is 
documented in Schnabel (1999). Much less is known about the scale of moonlighting, 
although reference may be made to the study by Schneider and Ernste (2000) which shows a 
dramatic increase in the German shadow economy. The cause and scale of these effects are 
difficult to fathom, as by the very nature of the phenomenon it is difficult to survey. 
The most useful evidence stems from that part of the German self-employment sector in 
Germany in which the workers are entitled to contribute voluntarily to the public retirement 
scheme. In this sector, around 90% of all male self-employed paid above-minimum 
contributions to the public retirement scheme in 1982. This figure had fallen to 16% by 1997. 
The behavior of female self-employed shows a similar development. Schnabel (1999) 
substantiates the link between this development and the incentive effects of the public 
retirement scheme using sophisticated econometric techniques. 
The “opting-out” rules in the United Kingdom and Hungary also provide empirical examples 
of revealed preferences. In the UK, over half of the labor force left the state’s contribution-
based pay-as-you-go system and switched to funded pensions when it was possible to opt 
freely between either system (Disney, 1996). In Hungary, workers were given the choice of 
remaining in the state’s pay-as-you-go financed system or changing to private, state-
subsidized accounts managed either by employees directly or by their employers. Older 
workers remained in the established system, most of the younger workers left (Palacios and 
Rocha, 1998). 
Overall we conclude that workers do not regard pay-as-you-go social insurance as “fair” 
insurance premia. The resulting feedback effects are considerable in those sectors where we 
can observe them. To date, however, data for a broader range of the work force is unavailable. 
The forthcoming changes in pension and social security law may provide the setting for 
precisely the type of “policy experiment” that is required to identify these feedback effects. 
9. Feedback effects of fiscal and social policy on the labor force 
participation of the older generation 
Identifying the feedback effects on the labor force participation of the older generation is 
somewhat simpler because econometric estimates are available which quantify the influence 
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of fiscal and social policy on labor supply. At the core of these estimates are the incentive 
effects which the pension and tax system exercises on lifetime working patterns. 
By 2004 the 1992 pension reform in Germany will have capped but not eliminated the major 
incentives favoring early retirement. The rules which have applied since 1972 enabled 
workers to enter early retirement (60 years for women, 63 years for workers with a 35-year 
contribution record) without incurring any financial penalty at all. Only if the beneficiary’s 
pension is calculated on the basis of the number of years contributions have been paid does 
the annual pension rise by around 2.5% if a worker works one year longer. This is however 
more than cancelled out by the fact that payment of this higher pension is postponed for one 
year which, given that life expectancy at retirement age is about 17 years, is tantamount to a 
reduction of about 6% in the overall period over which pension is received. The cash value of 
pensions thus falls in line with the deferment of retirement. If this loss is set in relation to the 
average income a worker could earn in this additional year, in other words if we calculate the 
implicit tax which the pension system imposes on later retirees, we arrive at very high tax 
rates. On the basis of the old retirement rules, they exceed 50%. They will still be around 25% 
once the new 1992 pension rules take full effect in the year 2004. 
We can draw on four different sources of empirical evidence which demonstrate the strength 
of the relevant feedback effects on lifetime labor supply. To begin with we can learn from the 
international variations in the implicit taxation imposed on later retirees. This implicit tax rate 
fluctuates widely in the 11 countries considered by Gruber and Wise (1999). It is low in Japan 
and the USA and especially high in Belgium and Italy. The relation between the implicit tax 
rates and the share of the labor force taking early retirement is shown in logarithmic form in 
figure 17. The strong correlation is a clear indication of the strength of the incentive effects 
generated by the implicit taxation of later retirees. 
 
Figure 17: Effect of implicit taxation on later retirees  
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Note: Old age LFP-Disincentive is measured as the implicit rate of tax: the loss in the expected cash value 
of pension benefits if a worker defers retirement by one year divided by the net earnings received by the 
worker in this same year. The values have been averaged across all the possible early retirement ages and 
standardized at a value of between 0 and 10. The value 0 corresponds, for example, to a zero rate of tax, the 
value 10 to 100% for all retirement ages between 60 and 69 years. Source: Börsch-Supan (2000b). 
 
The causal interpretation of a correlation of aggregated cross-sectional data is disputable. To 
begin with, the causal factor may be the high level of unemployment (which 
disproportionately affects older workers) rather than the favorable pension treatment for those 
taking early retirement. Riphahn and Schmidt (1997) however demonstrate that this 
explanation is not consistent with the onset of higher levels of early retirement – this 
development was already well under way before mass unemployment became a factor to 
reckon with. The other argument frequently wielded, namely that early retirement is less the 
expression of employees’ wishes to give up work for leisure than a response on the part of 
employers attempting to exploit pension law to push through restructuring measures is 
unconvincing: in fact it shows that the pension law has created incentives for employees and 
employers alike to profit from early retirement at the cost of the remaining contributors to the 
pension system. 
Econometric studies which, thanks to their quasi-experimental character, provide a more 
reliable basis for causal interpretations than figure 17 were first presented by Stock and Wise 
(1990). They used company data in which early retirement incentives have been used to 
enable specific cohorts to enter early retirement. The predictive validity of these effects for 
pension plans used in other firms too is demonstrated by Lumbsdaine, Stock and Wise, 
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(1992). Their models all show a strong response on the part of workers to the early retirement 
incentives. 
The 1972 pension reform in Germany provided an opportunity of estimating the influence of 
the low early retirement pension deductions in a “natural experiment”. Börsch-Supan (1992, 
2000b) shows that the reduction in pensionable age was not a gradual development but a rapid 
response to the implementation of the 1972 pension reform. A chronological analysis in 
particular reveals that the retirement age was skewed towards the earliest possible retirement 
ages and that, since 1972, there has been a systematic drift in the most typical retirement age 
even of male workers from 65 years to 60 years. The chronological relationships revealed by 
figure 18 are amenable to causal interpretation (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998). 
Figure 18: Effect of the 1972 pension reform on the retirement age 
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Note: Percentage distribution of age on initial receipt of benefits from the public retirement insurance scheme. 
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) based on VDR (1997). 
 
 
Finally, numerous German econometric studies also confirm that workers clearly respond to 
the incentive effects inherent in the public retirement scheme (Börsch-Supan, 1992; Schmidt, 
1995; Siddiqui, 1997; Börsch-Supan, 2000b). All these studies concur in calculating a robust 
response to these incentive effects, the magnitude of which implies that the actuarially 
inadequate deductions for the flexible retirement ages alone have reduced the average 
pensionable age by at least two years. 
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10.  Conclusions: How can fiscal and social policy mitigate the impacts of 
population aging on the labor market? 
This paper attempted to analyze the most important effects of population aging on the labor 
market and to illustrate the consequences for fiscal and social policy. What can be done in 
terms of fiscal and social policy to mitigate the impact of population aging? In order to 
address this question we draw on the three issues raised at the end of the introduction to 
second part of this paper. 
There is no dissense that the amply discussed age-determined increase in contribution and tax 
rates will have eminently important effects on future labor markets. While we have little 
precisely quantifiable evidence, what evidence we do have is qualitatively compelling and 
suggests that the growing wedge between gross and net earnings will reduce the labor force 
participation of the younger generation. If the government wants to reduce this wedge, it 
should strengthen the equivalence principle as much as possible by introducing a ”notional 
defined contribution” (NDC) system for the pay-as-you-go social insurance system. While 
this change does not change the financial balance of a pay-as-you-go system directly, it 
changes the incentives in the pension system both for workers and politicians, see Börsch-
Supan (2000c). 
The impact of fiscal and social policy on the labor force participation of the older generation 
is easier to quantify. Simply increasing the retirement-age-specific adjustment factors to about 
7 percent per year of earlier retirement would correct the average retirement age upwards by 
about 2 years. This would also remove the subsidization of early retirees by later retirees – 
which is also difficult for voters to accept – and would, at the same time, reduce the 
contribution and tax burden of the pay-as-you-go system. 
Alongside the reform of social security systems there are, however, two further important 
areas of policy which, to date, have attracted very little attention in the political discussion 
about population aging. First, the decrease in the relative size of the economically active 
population cannot be offset by higher capital intensity. Labor productivity will in fact need to 
increase over and above this mechanism in order to compensate for the effects of the shift in 
the age structure on domestic production. The strengthening of human capital formation 
through education and training thus assumes central importance particularly in the face of 
population aging. 
Second, the change in the structure of consumer goods’ and services’ demand will trigger 
additional sectoral mobility. If the government wants to accommodate these structural 
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changes, an important task of labor market policy must be to remove current constraints on 
mobility. Moreover, tax and social policy also have to accommodate increased mobility. For 
instance, social insurance reforms are likely to put greater weight on occupational pension and 
possibly even health care schemes. However, the portability of such schemes – a core 
prerequisite for mobility – runs counter to employers’ wish to use company benefit systems as 
a means of retaining good workers (Lazear, 1995). Hence, an important task of social policy 
is to create conditions which minimize such curbs on mobility. A second example is taxation 
of pensions. The deferred taxation of retirement income appears to be the only technically 
feasible method of ensuring the transparency and portability of occupational pensions, 
particularly, if they are not of the “defined contribution” type with clearly assigned individual 
accounts (Börsch-Supan and Lührmann, 2000). 
We conclude this paper with some comments on two areas of policy about which we are 
skeptical. It is advisable for fiscal and social policy to provide incentives for people to have 
more children or to attract more migrants to Germany? We believe that these two options will 
not be effective means to address the aging problem. Figure 3 shows that an increase in the 
birth rate would only begin to be felt after the year 2040 and thus after the peak change in the 
age structure has already taken place. In addition, as the example of the USA shows, the low 
birth rate is only one reason for the shift in the age structure of the population, the second is 
the secular increase in life expectancy.5
Immigration is also unlikely to be the promising cushion of the aging process, as it is 
frequently advertized. While it is theoretically obvious that an influx of young immigrants can 
compensate for the aging process, in reality two problems arise. First, the domestic labor 
market would need to be sufficiently flexible to absorb migrant workers and to offer the 
requisite training. This does not come without costs. In addition, the number of immigrants 
would have to be sufficiently large. Given the typical age structure of immigrants – 
immigrants to Germany are on average ten years younger than the indigenous population – 
around 750,000 people (workers and family) would need to migrate to Germany every year 
 
5 There are potentially important feedback effects of social policy and fertility. Cigno (1995) examined the 
interaction between social security and the birth rate using historical times series. The evidence still remains 
controversial. 
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up to the year 2035 in order to fully balance out the aging process in Germany.6 Such 
extremely high numbers make such a “solution” unrealistic. 
Hence, the main insight for fiscal and social policy is that we have to solve the problems 
which population aging will impose on the labor markets ourselves: by reforming social 
insurance, by accumulating more real and human capital and by facilitating structural 
adjustments. 
 
6 Börsch-Supan (2000a). Assuming that the unemployment rate among immigrants remains 50% above the 
current overall rate for Germany.  
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